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NEVER MISTAKE LAW FOR JUSTICE: RELEASING
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS FROM LEGAL PURGATORY
R.K. Brinkmann*
Abstract: Washington courts impose two mandatory legal financial obligations (LFOs) on
almost anyone who pleads guilty to or is convicted of a crime: a $100 DNA sample fee and a
crime victim penalty assessment of $250 for misdemeanors and $500 for felonies. These fines
run afoul of the Social Security Act, which bars attachment of Social Security benefits to pay
debts, including LFOs. As a result, defendants whose sole source of income is Social Security
benefits are not obligated to pay their mandatory LFOs. But such defendants cannot obtain
certificates of discharge to clear their conviction records and thus complete their reintegration
into society. The Supreme Court of Washington recently denied review of State v. Conway, in
which a disabled Social Security recipient petitioned for remission of her mandatory LFOs.
The decision to not hear Conway’s case leaves impoverished Social Security recipients in a
legal purgatory where they do not have to pay their LFOs but are simultaneously unable to
discharge their criminal records. To correct this injustice, Washington should either bar courts
from imposing any LFOs on defendants who are indigent or allow such defendants to petition
for remission of mandatory LFOs, thereby freeing people such as Ms. Conway from a lifelong
purgatory of legal debt.

INTRODUCTION
Karen Conway pleaded guilty in Clark County Superior Court to one
Class C felony count of maintaining a dwelling for controlled substances
in 2007.1 As part of her sentence, the court ordered her to pay several
thousand dollars in fees, including a $500 victim penalty assessment.2 Ms.
Conway lives entirely on Supplemental Security Income (SSI)—a type of
Social Security benefit for disabled individuals—and has done so since
1989.3 The Social Security Act forbids courts from forcing Social Security
recipients to use their benefits to pay legal fees.4 Consequently, the
Superior Court remitted, or cancelled, much of Conway’s legal debt in
*
J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2021. For sharing their wisdom,
advice, and sense of purpose, I thank Magda Baker, Hillary Behrman, Helen Anderson, and Hugh
Spitzer. I would also like to thank Oliana Luke, Quynh La, and Anthony McCluskey for their
invaluable thoughts, comments, and arguments; and the rest of the Washington Law Review Editorial
Board for their dedication and hard work. And I could never express enough gratitude to Craig
Goldberg and Joseph Liberti for setting the cornerstone of my foundation, many years ago.
1. State v. Conway, 8 Wash. App. 2d 538, 542, 438 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2019).
2. Petition for Review at 2 n.1, State v. Conway, 194 Wash. 2d 1010, 452 P.3d 1240 (2019)
(No. 50032-9-II) [hereinafter Petition for Review].
3. Id. at 1; Conway, 8 Wash. App. 2d at 542, 438 P.3d at 1238.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 407(a).
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2016 due to her lack of resources. However, the court could not dismiss
Conway’s victim penalty assessment because, unlike the rest of her debt,
the victim penalty assessment is a mandatory legal financial
obligation (LFO).5
American courts have imposed monetary sanctions on criminal
defendants since the 1800s.6 Today, all fifty states impose some form of
LFO on defendants.7 Some states justify LFOs on rehabilitative grounds,
arguing that LFOs discourage defendants from repeating their
misbehavior—Washington has not historically claimed any such
justification.8 In Washington, anyone who is convicted of or pleads guilty
to most crimes receives LFOs that they must pay off as part of their
sentence.9 Former defendants owed Washington State approximately $2.5
billion in LFO debt in 2014,10 and the state adds roughly 19,000 new debt
accounts each year.11
Washington’s legislature, with the intent of fostering rehabilitation, has
taken steps to ease the process by which defendants reintegrate into
society.12 But Washingtonians who are indigent—especially those who
are disabled and rely on SSI to survive—frequently carry immovable debt
burdens long after their prison or jail sentence ends. The Washington
legislature and Supreme Court of Washington both have the authority to
correct the injustice.
Without an intervention, the clash between state laws mandating LFOs
and federal laws shielding Social Security income will continue to trap
many people whose stories mirror Ms. Conway’s. Due to the protections
5. Conway, 8 Wash. App. 2d at 542–43, 438 P.3d at 1238.
6. Alexes Harris, Heather Evans & Katherine Beckett, Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt
and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOCIO. 1753, 1758 (2010).
7. Juleyka Lantigua-Williams, How Prison Debt Ensnares Offenders, THE ATL. (June 2,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/how-prison-debt-ensnaresoffenders/484826/ [https://perma.cc/W6Y8-K9KS].
8. Harris et al., supra note 6, at 1757.
9. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.68.035(2) (2020) (exempting most vehicle-based offenses from the
crime victim penalty assessment but still apply the assessment for people convicted of vehicular
assault; vehicular homicide; evading the police; possessing or trading “hot” vehicles; DUI; violating
the terms of an occupational, temporary restricted, or ignition interlock driver’s license; hit-and-runs;
unlawful operation of a snowmobile; unlawful operation of a nonhighway vehicle; negligent driving;
leaving children unattended in standing vehicle with motor running; racing on highways; reckless
driving; disobeying police officers, flaggers, or firefighters; or operating a mobile home
without insurance).
10. Kim Eckart, Washington State Supreme Court Takes Up Court-Fee Reform, Considers UW
Data at Sold-Out Wednesday Symposium, UNIV. WASH.: UW NEWS (June 6, 2018),
https://www.washington.edu/news/2018/06/06/washington-state-supreme-court-takes-up-court-feereform-considers-uw-data-at-sold-out-wednesday-symposium/ [https://perma.cc/24RG-B798].
11. Lantigua-Williams, supra note 7.
12. See infra Part III.

Brinkmann (Do Not Delete)

2020]

12/14/2020 9:13 PM

NEVER MISTAKE LAW FOR JUSTICE

1955

of the Social Security Act, a court cannot order Ms. Conway to use her
SSI benefits to pay off her legal debt; however, no legal mechanism
currently exists to let her apply for remittance of her LFOs. As a result,
she will never complete the terms of her sentence and the burdens of her
guilty plea will follow her for the rest of her life. The repercussions
include an outstanding conviction on any background check and
permanent damage to her credit score, both of which have undermined her
ability to find stable housing since her release.13
The Supreme Court of Washington declined to review Ms. Conway’s
case when she appealed in 2019, seeking remission of her mandatory
LFO: the victim penalty assessment.14 Therefore, until a similar case takes
up the issue, it falls to Washington’s legislature to grant Ms. Conway and
those similarly situated a degree of relief.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I provides substantive and
procedural background on LFOs in Washington and explains why the
legislature currently stands as the best institution to resolve the issue of
mandatory LFOs imposed on SSI recipients. Part II covers recent judicial
and legislative developments that provide a foundation for this
Comment’s proposed legislative solution. Part III details public interest
issues related to LFOs that have highlighted the need for change in
Washington’s mandatory LFO policy. Finally, Part IV proposes two
specific ways that Washington’s legislature or Supreme Court could
liberate former defendants from the purgatory that mandatory LFOs
create. One solution would bar courts from imposing any LFOs on a
defendant who a court finds indigent. The second solution would allow
defendants who can demonstrate financial hardship to petition for
remission after courts have imposed the mandatory LFOs. Several
possible standards could apply for the second solution, from providing
protection for only SSI recipients, to shielding any defendant who
receives means-tested benefits, to covering any defendant who meets the
statutory definition for indigence. This Comment ultimately suggests
adoption of the first solution for the most comprehensive administration
of justice.
I.

LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS: THE POST-PRISON
PUNISHMENT
Every state in the nation imposes financial obligations on criminal

13. Ericka B. Adams, Elsa Y. Chen & Rosella Chapman, Erasing the Mark of a Criminal Past: ExOffenders’ Expectations and Experiences with Record Clearance, 19 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 23,
26 (2017).
14. State v. Conway, 194 Wash. 2d 1010, 452 P.3d 1240 (2019) (denying review).
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defendants. Each jurisdiction has its own particularities and nuances. In
Washington, courts have the discretion to waive or remit most LFOs.15
Only a few LFOs are mandatory and apply to almost every criminal case.16
Even defendants whose financial status qualifies them for automatic
waiver of discretionary LFOs will still receive mandatory LFOs, despite
their inability to pay the fines.
A.

Obligations of All Shapes and Sizes

All fifty states impose LFOs.17 The fines’ amounts, justifications,
labels, and beneficiaries vary as widely as the weather between
jurisdictions. LFOs are either discretionary or mandatory. Courts may
make a judgment call about imposing discretionary LFOs, weighing
relevant factors such as the defendant’s income or if the crime resulted in
harm that monetary restitution could repair.18 In contrast, mandatory
LFOs grant courts no discretion: if the LFO’s criteria are met, then the
court must impose the fine.19
Washington and many other states impose LFOs to recoup some of the
costs of running their court systems. Twenty-seven states charge
defendants for court costs;20 thirty-one for drug, alcohol, mental health, or
DNA testing;21 and forty-five require defendants to pay for costs of
monitoring or incarceration.22 Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia all
impose mandatory fees for the use of a public defender that a court has no
opportunity to remit if a defendant lacks the ability to pay.23 North
Carolina charges defendants seventy-five dollars per hour for public

15. WASH. STATE SUP. CT. MINORITY & JUST. COMM’N, WA STATE SUPERIOR COURTS: 2018
REFERENCE GUIDE ON LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS (LFOS) (2018) [hereinafter LFO REFERENCE
GUIDE], https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/manuals/superior%20court%20lfos.pdf
[https://perma.cc/47NM-UE7K].
16. Id.
17. Monica Llorente, Criminalizing Poverty Through Fines, Fees, and Costs, AM. BAR ASS’N:
ARTICLES (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/childrensrights/articles/2016/criminalizing-poverty-fines-fees-costs/ [https://perma.cc/T3BA-FA5H].
18. LFO REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 15.
19. Id.
20. Llorente, supra note 17 (“Examples are single fees, witness fees, transportation costs,
prosecution costs, court operations, depositions, and transcripts.”).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See ALICIA BANNON, MITALI NAGRECHA & REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.,
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
DEBT:
A
BARRIER
TO
REENTRY
12–13
(2010),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Criminal-Justice-Debt-%20ABarrier-Reentry.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XXZ-AKNG] (showing that fourteen of fifteen states
surveyed had at least one mandatory fee that courts must impose on convicted defendants).
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defense services in non-capital cases.24 For some felonies, Virginia bills
defendants up to $1,235 per charge.25 And it costs defendants in Maine
$300 to have a jury trial.26
Across the United States, persistent legal debt interferes with the ability
to acquire loans “to support business endeavors or purchase assets,” and
the fear of wage garnishments can create disincentives to find work for
those otherwise capable.27 Several former defendants interviewed for a
2010 study examining legal debt throughout the United States indicated
that LFOs encouraged them to re-offend by incentivizing them to seek
“illegal means to support themselves and, ironically, to make LFO
payments.”28 Even restitution LFOs—imposed to recoup state payouts to
crime victims—frequently fail to serve their purpose: if a defendant can
only afford ten dollars per month in LFOs, a $3,000 restitution LFO will
keep the state waiting for twenty-five years before it is paid off.29
Many states also punish the failure to pay LFOs. Approximately thirty
states impose additional fines if a defendant misses or makes a delayed
payment.30 Roughly twenty states consider failure to pay as a probation or
other supervised-release violation.31 California has allowed 15% interest
rates on LFO accounts that have been delinquent for more than thirty
days,32 while Illinois charges the same rate on unpaid balances—plus a
30% collection fee.33 Finally, thirteen states either charge defendants for
expunging their criminal records or, like Washington, do not permit
defendants to seek expungement until they have paid off all of
their LFOs.34
The fact that judges are supposed to impose the fines does not mean
that they always comply: some North Carolina judges “waive or remit
[North Carolina’s mandatory] reimbursement provision, citing
constitutional concerns” such as due process and equal protection.35
Washington trial court judges who have attempted a similar tactic have

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Llorente, supra note 17.
27. Harris et al., supra note 6, at 1781.
28. Id. at 1785.
29. Llorente, supra note 17.
30. Lantigua-Williams, supra note 7; see also infra Part II.
31. Llorente, supra note 17.
32. Harris et al., supra note 6, at 1759 (citing CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19280 (West 2019)).
33. Llorente, supra note 17.
34. Id.
35. BANNON ET AL., supra note 23, at 12 & 38 n.40 (citing Telephone Interview with Danielle
Carman, Assistant Dir., N.C. Off. of Indigent Def. Servs. (Nov. 20, 2009)).
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seen those decisions overturned on appeal.36 But overall, states that
condition the return of defendants’ voting rights on payment of their LFOs
have started to face legal challenges—and are losing.37
B.

The Burden at Home: Mandatory LFOs in Washington

Washington State justifies imposing LFOs by arguing that the fines
hold defendants financially accountable to their communities, provide
remedies for victims, and help fund the court system. These justifications
backfire when defendants cannot pay.38 LFOs in Washington vary based
on the crime and financial capacity of the defendant. Courts can decide to
not impose some LFOs or to remit them later if a defendant demonstrates
sufficient financial hardship. Other LFOs do not give courts a choice.
Washington instituted its practice of imposing LFOs to “hold[]
offenders accountable to victims, counties, cities, the state, municipalities,
and society for the assessed costs associated with their crimes; and [to]
provide[] remedies for an individual or other entities to recoup or at least
defray a portion of the loss associated with the costs of felonious
behavior.”39 Thus, in addition to deterrence and retribution, LFOs serve
as a source of funding for Washington courts. Trial courts in Washington
receive only a small portion of their budget from the state government,
deriving most of their funding from local sources.40 This results in a mix
of unpredictable income sources—especially in areas where voters resist
tax-based budgetary initiatives.41 Despite their inconsistency, LFOs are a

36. State v. Lacy, No. 50738-2-II, 2019 Wash. App. LEXIS 1342, at *8 (May 29, 2019) (“Under
the current version of RCW 9.94A.6333(3)(f), the trial court does not have authority to waive
the crime victim penalty assessment. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s waiver of the crime victim
penalty assessment imposed on Lacy.”).
37. Iowa, the last state to permanently disenfranchise every person convicted of a felony unless that
person directly appealed to the governor, recently restored voting rights to most former defendants
(except for people convicted of homicide) who complete the terms of their sentence without requiring
full payment of LFOs. Katarina Sostaric, Governor Acts to Restore Voting Rights to Iowans With
Felony Convictions, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/08/05/
899284703/governor-acts-to-restore-voting-rights-to-iowans-with-past-felony-convictions
[https://perma.cc/BQ8X-YVAR].
38. KATHERINE A. BECKETT, ALEXES M. HARRIS & HEATHER EVANS, WASH. STATE MINORITY &
JUST. COMM’N, THE ASSESSMENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS IN
WASHINGTON STATE 74 (2008), http://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/pdf/2008LFO_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8CYK-RZJM].
39. See 1989 Wash. Sess. Laws 1170.
40. ALAN CARLSON, KATE HARRISON & JOHN K. HUDZIK, JUST. MGMT. INST., ADEQUATE,
STABLE, EQUITABLE, AND RESPONSIBLE TRIAL COURT FUNDING: REFRAMING THE STATE VS. LOCAL
DEBATE 1 (2008), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/223973.pdf [https://perma.cc/49UWDEB7].
41. Id. at 111.

Brinkmann (Do Not Delete)

2020]

12/14/2020 9:13 PM

NEVER MISTAKE LAW FOR JUSTICE

1959

preferred source of funding for local court systems.42
A Washington Superior Court will impose LFOs on anyone who pleads
guilty to or is convicted of a crime; the person must then pay off the LFOs
as part of their sentence.43 LFOs come in many forms and with many
labels: fees, fines, assessments, costs, restitution, and more.44 All LFOs
must be paid to the court.45 The amount of LFOs that Washington courts
imposed increased 41% between 2000 and 2014.46 Washington courts
imposed LFOs totaling roughly $335 million in 2018.47 But outstanding
LFO debt in Washington totaled $2.5 billion in that same year.48 The
discrepancy stems from the return rate on LFOs: only 23.8%.49
Historically, any amount of LFO debt could quickly spiral out of
control. Until 2018, LFOs assigned to a collection agency accrued interest
at a rate of 12% per year.50 Some counties also applied a collection fee of
$100 per year that went directly to the court clerk instead of paying off
the LFO debt.51 As of late 2020, restitution LFOs still accrue interest at
the same rate as civil judgments: 12% per year.52
While sentencing courts have discretion to waive or remit certain
LFOs, that discretion is not available for all LFOs. For mandatory LFOs,
such as the $500 crime victim penalty assessment (VPA) charged to Ms.
Conway, the court must impose the fine if certain criteria are met.53
Defendants have no way to clear the debt except by paying it off.54
42. See, e.g., id. (explaining how Washington raised several LFOs to fund new court information
systems in the late 1990s).
43. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760(1) (2020); LFO REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 15.
44. LFO REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 15.
45. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760.
46. Unique Calculator Designed to Set Appropriate Fines and Fees Launches for Washington
Courts, WASH. CTS: NEWS & INFO. (June 8, 2018), https://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/?fa=newsi
nfo.internetdetail&newid=16005 [https://perma.cc/ZSA4-XPKU].
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Legislature Passes Bill to Bring Fairness to Washington’s System of Legal Financial
Obligations, ACLU WASH. (Mar. 6, 2018) [hereinafter Legislature Passes Bill], https://www.acluwa.org/news/legislature-passes-bill-bring-fairness-washington%E2%80%99s-system-legalfinancial-obligations [https://perma.cc/6PJ6-UEN4].
50. 2018 Wash. Sess. Laws 1616 (Legal Financial Obligations); see also Questions and Answers
About Legal Financial Obligations (LFOs), ACLU WASH. [hereinafter Questions and Answers],
https://www.aclu-wa.org/questions-and-answers-about-legal-financial-obligations-lfos
[https://perma.cc/7GK5-SJH2].
51. Questions and Answers, supra note 50.
52. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.090(1) (2020); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.110 (2020); WASH.
REV. CODE § 6.01.060 (2020).
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.68.035(1)(a) (2020); LFO REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 15.
54. See State v. Catling, 193 Wash. 2d 252, 265, 438 P.3d 1174, 1180 (2019) (explaining that a
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Washington’s state and local governments spent a total of $15.8 million
on LFO collection efforts in 2009—reaping a net profit of $5.8 million.55
With an increasing debt load, and the administrative costs of collecting
LFOs all but canceling out their revenue, Washington’s legislature
decided to make a change in 2018. The legislature rewrote several key
LFO statutes in the Revised Code of Washington (RCW) to bar courts
from imposing certain LFOs on defendants who meet a statutory
definition for indigence.56 The 2018 amendments altered
RCW 10.101.0101, which now instructs courts to find a defendant
indigent for the purpose of LFO payments if, at the time of sentencing,
the person has been involuntarily committed in a mental health facility,
has a post-tax annual income that is less than 125% of the federal poverty
level, or receives certain types of public assistance.57 The relevant types
of public assistance include “[t]emporary assistance for needy families,
aged, blind, or disabled assistance benefits, [certain] medical care
services . . . , pregnant women assistance benefits, poverty-related
veterans’ benefits, food stamps . . . , refugee resettlement benefits,”
Medicaid, and Supplemental Security Income.58
Under the 2018 legislative amendments, even if a court has ordered a
defendant to pay LFOs as part of their sentence, defendants may now
petition for remission of any unpaid discretionary LFOs.59 If the defendant
can demonstrate that paying the discretionary LFOs “will impose manifest
hardship on the defendant or the defendant’s immediate family,” the court
may remit the LFOs wholly or in part, modify the defendant’s method of
payment, or convert the unpaid portion of the LFOs to community
service hours.60
Over the last decade, Washington’s courts and legislature have
amended and reworked the LFO system to increase equity. Today, only a
few mandatory LFOs persist. An example of a remaining mandatory LFO
is that a person’s first felony conviction—as well as certain domestic
violence and sex crime misdemeanors—will result in the collection of a

county clerk may monitor defendant’s changing circumstances and to alter defendant’s payment
schedule “as needed,” but cannot remit mandatory LFOs).
55. Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction: Monetary Sanctions as
Misguided Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 509, 527–28 (2011) (citing WASH. STATE ASS’N
OF CNTY. OFFS., 2009 REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE ON THE FISCAL IMPACT
OF ESSB 5990 (2009)).
56. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760(1) (2020); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.160(3).
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.101.010(3)(a)–(c).
58. Id. § 10.101.010(3)(a).
59. Id. § 10.01.160(4).
60. Id.
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DNA sample and a fee of $100.61
Only one mandatory LFO still applies to almost every single criminal
case, regardless of the severity of the crime or any other factor. Any
person who is convicted or pleads guilty in a Washington Superior Court
to any crime (except certain minor motor vehicle offenses) must pay the
VPA: $250 for a misdemeanor or $500 for a felony.62 The VPA is then
deposited “into a fund maintained exclusively for the support of
comprehensive programs to encourage and facilitate testimony by the
victims of crimes and witnesses to crimes,” which the county runs.63 The
fund also receives at least 1.75% of the money a county collects from most
other LFOs64 and 1.75% of every city’s and town’s receipts from parking
tickets.65 Washington instituted and preserved the VPA to financially
support witness and victim advocacy, with particular concern dedicated
to the families of victims “killed as a result of a criminal act.”66 A county’s
prosecutor must approve of a program before that program may receive

61. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.754 (2020); id. § 43.43.7541. Additionally, any conviction or guilty
plea results in a $200 filing fee, although recent amendments to the statute now prohibit courts from
imposing this fee on defendants who are indigent. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.18.020(2)(h) (2020); 2018
Wash. Sess. Laws 1632 (Legal Financial Obligations).
62. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.68.035(1)–(2) (2020).
63. Id. § 7.68.035(4).
64. Id. (“Each county shall deposit [100%] of the money it receives per case or cause of
action . . . not less than [1.75%] of the remaining money it retains under RCW 10.82.070 and the
money it retains under chapter 3.62 RCW, and all money it receives under subsection (7) of this
section into a fund . . . .”); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.070 (“(1) All sums of money derived
from costs, fines, penalties, and forfeitures imposed or collected, in whole or in part, by a superior
court for violation of orders of injunction, mandamus and other like writs, for contempt of court, or
for breach of the penal laws shall be paid in cash . . . within [20] days after the collection, to the county
treasurer of the county in which the same have accrued. (2) . . . [T]he county treasurer shall remit
monthly [32%] of the money received . . . to the state treasurer for deposit in the state general fund
and shall deposit the remainder as provided by law. ‘Certain costs’ as used in this subsection,
means . . . those costs awarded against convicted defendants in criminal actions under
RCW 10.01.160, 10.46.190, or 36.18.040, or other similar statutes . . . awarded for the specific
reimbursement of costs incurred by the state or county in the prosecution of the case, including the
fees of defense counsel . . . . (3) All fees, fines, forfeitures and penalties collected or assessed by a
district court because of the violation of a state law shall be remitted as provided in chapter 3.62 RCW
as now exists or is later amended. All fees, fines, forfeitures, and penalties collected or assessed by a
superior court in cases on appeal from a lower court shall be remitted to the municipal or district court
from which the cases were appealed.”).
65. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.68.035(7).
66. 1996 Wash. Sess. Laws 375 (“The increased financial support is intended to allow county
victim/witness programs to more fully assist victims and witnesses through the criminal justice
processes. On the state level, the increased funds will allow the remedial intent of the crime victims
compensation program to be more fully served. Specifically, the increased funds from offender
penalty assessments will allow more appropriate compensation for families of victims who are killed
as a result of a criminal act . . . .”).
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money from the VPA fund.67
Washington originally instituted the VPA to relieve some of the burden
of compensating and assisting victims from the Department of Labor and
Industries.68 The legislature has reiterated its desire to financially support
victims—especially the families of homicide victims—through several
iterations of the statute.69 Although Washington courts must impose the
VPA in almost every criminal case that results in a conviction or a guilty
plea, actually collecting the money from defendants does not always
prove feasible or legal.
C.

How Social Security’s Anti-Attachment Provision Affects LFOs in
Washington

Roughly 1.3 million Washington residents collected Social Security
checks in 2019.70 More specifically, 148,731 Washington residents
received SSI benefits, which are only available to “low-income aged,
blind, or disabled persons.”71 Although many defendants have financial
troubles, those who collect SSI face unique challenges compared to even
ordinary Social Security beneficiaries.

67. The programs must meet several criteria: they must provide victims and witnesses with
“comprehensive services,” with a “particular emphasis on serious crimes against persons and
property”; be administered by the county prosecutor directly or by contract; make reasonable efforts
“to inform the known victim or [their] surviving dependents of the existence of this chapter and the
procedure for making application for benefits”; assist victims with “the restitution and adjudication
process”; and aid “victims of violent crimes in the preparation and presentation of their claims to the
department of labor and industries under this chapter.” WASH. REV. CODE § 7.68.035(4).
68. See 1982 Wash. Sess. Laws 1008 (“The intent of the legislature is that the victim of crime
program will be self-funded. Toward that end, the department of labor and industries shall not pay
benefits beyond the resources of the account. . . . It is further the intent of the legislature that the
percentage of funds devoted to comprehensive programs for victim assistance, as provided in section
1 of this act, be re-examined to ensure that it does not unreasonably conflict with the higher priority
of compensating victims.”).
69. See 1996 Wash. Sess. Laws 374–75 (“The legislature finds that current funding for county
victim-witness advocacy programs is inadequate. Also, the state crime victims compensation program
should be enhanced to provide for increased benefits to families of victims who are killed as a result
of a criminal act. It is the intent of the legislature to provide increased financial support for the county
and state crime victim and witness programs by requiring offenders to pay increased penalty
assessments upon conviction of a gross misdemeanor or felony crime. The increased financial support
is intended to allow county victim/witness programs to more fully assist victims and witnesses
through the criminal justice processes. On the state level, the increased funds will allow the remedial
intent of the crime victims compensation program to be more fully served. Specifically, the increased
funds from offender penalty assessments will allow more appropriate compensation for families of
victims who are killed as a result of a criminal act, including reasonable burial benefits.”).
70. Congressional Statistics, December 2019: Washington, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFF. OF RET. &
DISABILITY POL’Y, https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/factsheets/cong_stats/2019/wa.html
[https://perma.cc/LU7Z-N535].
71. Id.
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SSI recipients are not merely indigent. Applying for SSI requires
meeting a high bar for proving an inability to work—only 28.8% of
applicants nationwide received benefits in 2018.72 Applicants must meet
a statutory definition for disability, which means that they must qualify as
unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to blindness or
“any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”73 Indeed, anyone
collecting disability benefits has already gone through a rigorous
process—one which frequently requires the assistance of an attorney—to
certify that they cannot perform any “substantial gainful activity” because
of an impairment.74
Despite the immense challenge of acquiring SSI benefits, keeping those
benefits may be more complicated than qualifying for them in the first
place. Even after granting benefits, the government may reduce the
amount paid if the recipient acquires additional resources that can be used
to meet food or shelter needs.75 The government may also terminate SSI
benefits if the recipient accumulates more than $2,000 in assets (or $3,000
for a married couple).76
Social Security benefits also have a different legal status than other
forms of income. The federal Social Security Act’s anti-attachment
72. See Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 2019:
Outcomes of Applications for Disability Benefits, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFF. OF RET. & DISABILITY
POL’Y, https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/2019/sect04.html [https://perma.cc/XK6
U-DJWW] (showing, in Table Sixty, the award rate has decreased from 56% in 1999 to 28.8%
in 2018).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)–(B); see also id. § 423(d)(5)(A) (“An individual shall not be
considered to be under a disability unless [they] furnish[] such medical and other evidence of the
existence thereof as the Commissioner of Social Security may require. An individual’s statement as
to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability as defined in this
section; there must be medical signs and findings, established by medically acceptable clinical or
laboratory diagnostic techniques, which show the existence of a medical impairment that results from
anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which could reasonably be expected to
produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which, when considered with all evidence required
to be furnished under this paragraph (including statements of the individual or [their] physician as to
the intensity and persistence of such pain or other symptoms which may reasonably be accepted as
consistent with the medical signs and findings), would lead to a conclusion that the individual is under
a disability. Objective medical evidence of pain or other symptoms established by medically
acceptable clinical or laboratory techniques (for example, deteriorating nerve or muscle tissue) must
be considered in reaching a conclusion as to whether the individual is under a disability.”).
74. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2020).
75. Countable Income for SSI Program, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. [hereinafter Countable Income for SSI
Program], https://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/countableincome.html [https://perma.cc/8DKX-9KUL].
76. Spotlight on Resources—2019 Edition, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. [hereinafter Spotlight on
Resources—2019 Edition], https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/spotlights/spot-resources.htm
[https://perma.cc/W3KX-ACKU].
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provision protects money provided under the title from “execution, levy,
attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or . . . the operation of
any bankruptcy or insolvency law.”77 Washington’s Supreme Court has
held that the provision applies to LFO payments: if Social Security
benefits are a defendant’s only source of income, a court cannot order that
defendant to make payments on those obligations.78 However, the antiattachment provision does not prevent courts from imposing LFOs on
such defendants in the first place.79
D.

Wakefield and Catling’s Effect on LFOs for Social Security
Recipients

Two cases from recent years have altered LFO laws in Washington,
beginning to turn the tide in favor of defendants who survive on Social
Security benefits. But the cases also left a hole in the law that defendants
such as Ms. Conway can fall through.
In City of Richland v. Wakefield,80 a sentencing court ordered Briana
Wakefield to make monthly LFO payments of $15.81 Ms. Wakefield was
a single mother of four who was both homeless and disabled—her only
income was the her monthly Social Security check of $710.82 Ms.
Wakefield appealed to the Supreme Court of Washington to ask for the
remittance of her discretionary LFOs; she did not contest her mandatory
LFOs or the imposition of either set of penalties.83
The Supreme Court of Washington held that the sentencing court
violated the anti-attachment provision of the Social Security Act when it
ordered Ms. Wakefield to pay $15 per month from her Social Security
benefits towards her LFOs.84 The Court explicitly held that “federal law
prohibits courts from ordering defendants to pay LFOs if the person’s only
source of income” is Social Security benefits.85 Consequently, Wakefield
bars the imposition of discretionary LFOs on defendants who a court finds
indigent, and protects Social Security benefits from attachment to pay
mandatory LFO payments. But it does not allow petitions for remission
or stop courts from imposing mandatory LFOs in the first place on

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

42 U.S.C. § 407(a).
City of Richland v. Wakefield, 186 Wash. 2d 596, 609, 380 P.3d 459, 466 (2016).
State v. Catling, 193 Wash. 2d 252, 260–61, 438 P.3d 1174, 1178 (2019).
186 Wash. 2d 596, 380 P.3d 459 (2016).
Id. at 599, 380 P.3d at 461.
Id.
Id. at 601, 380 P.3d at 462.
Id. at 608, 380 P.3d at 465 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 407(a)).
Id. at 609, 380 P.3d at 465–66.
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defendants who are indigent.
Three years later, Jason Catling, the defendant in State v. Catling,86
unsuccessfully attempted to expand Wakefield to shield defendants
relying on Social Security from the imposition of mandatory LFOs.87 Mr.
Catling challenged the imposition of his mandatory LFOs on the grounds
that, because he was indigent and reliant on Social Security, imposing
those LFOs ran counter to both Wakefield and the Social Security Act.88
The Supreme Court of Washington re-affirmed that defendants who are
indigent and rely on Social Security could not be forced to pay any LFOs
if they had no other income besides Social Security.89 But the Court
continued to permit sentencing courts to impose mandatory LFOs on
such defendants.90
Today, Wakefield ensures that defendants who are indigent can avoid
or remit discretionary LFOs, and Catling protects Social Security
recipients from being court-ordered to pay mandatory LFOs. However, to
avoid forced payment, defendants relying on Social Security must
continually demonstrate that those benefits are their only income through
regular appearances before a clerk.91 Because courts cannot consider
ability to pay before imposing mandatory LFOs and cannot waive the
mandatory fines, even SSI recipients—vetted by the government to ensure
that they cannot procure additional income—have no mechanism to clear
their LFO debt.
Court challenges to LFOs have struggled to identify explicit
constitutional violations, especially because indigent defendants are not a
protected class under the Equal Protection Clause,92 which leaves public
86. 193 Wash. 2d 252, 438 P.3d 1174 (2019).
87. Id. at 255, 438 P.3d at 1175.
88. Id. at 254–56, 438 P.3d at 1175–76.
89. Id. at 260, 438 P.3d at 1178.
90. Id. (“An offender being indigent . . . is not grounds for failing to impose . . . the crime victim
penalty assessment under RCW 7.68.035.” (quoting 2018 Wash. Sess. Laws 1625)). Catling relied
heavily on a Michigan case that upheld a restitution order when the defendant’s only income was
Social Security benefits. The In re Lampart Court held that the Social Security Act “merely
prohibit[ed] the trial court from using legal process to compel satisfaction of the restitution order from
those benefits” but did not prevent courts from imposing the orders on defendants whose only source
of income was Social Security. 856 N.W.2d 192, 203 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014). The Catling Court
specified that sentencing orders must indicate that LFOs “may not be satisfied out of any funds subject
to” the Social Security Act, but noted that the Act lacks specific language immunizing against the
imposition of mandatory LFOs for defendants who rely on those benefits to survive. Catling, 193
Wash. 2d at 264–66, 438 P.3d at 1180–81 (2019) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 407(a)).
91. Catling, 193 Wash. 2d at 265, 438 P.3d at 1180 (“During the period of repayment, the county
clerk may require the offender to report to the clerk for the purpose of reviewing the appropriateness
of the collection schedule for the legal financial obligation.” (citing 2018 Wash. Sess. Laws 1628)).
92. See, e.g., State v. Allemand, Nos. 32560-1-III, 32456-7-III, 2016 Wash. App. LEXIS 743, at
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policy as the main argument in favor of amending the laws.93 Due process
challenges to mandatory LFOs for indigent defendants hit a similar wall
because of the presumption that defendants may gain the ability to pay off
their LFOs in the future.94 In brief: LFOs will not violate an indigent
defendant’s equal protection or due process rights unless the state
imprisons the defendant for failure to pay.95 Public interest concerns thus
*24 (Apr. 14, 2016) (indicating that indigent defendants are not a protected class). But see Grant Cnty.
Fire Prot. Dist. No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, 150 Wash. 2d 791, 806–07, 83 P.3d 419, 425–26 (2004)
(indicating that WASH. CONST. art I, § 12 is potentially more protective than the U.S. Constitution’s
Equal Protection Clause). A statute permitting recoupment of public defense costs from indigent
defendants did not violate equal protection because it did not constitute invidious discrimination
against impoverished persons, or discrimination between people who are convicted versus acquitted.
Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 46 (1974). Washington courts have used Fuller to justify mandatory
LFOs in the face of equal protection challenges. State v. Mathers, 193 Wash. App. 913, 926, 376 P.3d
1163, 1170 (2016) (“Mathers also argues that treating DNA and VPA fees as mandatory violates
equal protection under Fuller. . . . In that case, the Court reviewed non-mandatory costs accumulated
from prosecuting a specific defendant. Mathers improperly relies on [Fuller] to demonstrate that
the Fourteenth Amendment is only satisfied if RCW 10.01.160(3) is read in tandem with specific cost
and fee statutes. Fuller asserts no such precedent. The case does not address mandatory cost and fee
statutes. Following our Supreme Court precedent, we conclude the imposition of DNA and VPA fees
on Mathers did not violate equal protection.” (citations omitted)).
93. State v. Barklind delineated “the salient features of a constitutionally permissible costs and fees
structure.” State v. Curry, 118 Wash. 2d 911, 915, 829 P.2d 166, 167 (1992) (citing State v. Barklind,
87 Wash. 2d 814, 557 P.2d 314 (1976)). The Court held that fees (1) must not be mandatory; (2) can
only be imposed on convicted defendants; (3) may only be ordered if the defendant is or will be able
to pay; (4) must consider the defendant’s financial resources; (5) may not be imposed if there is no
likelihood defendant’s indigency will end; (6) the defendant must be able to petition the court for
remission; (7) the defendant cannot be held in contempt for failure to pay if the default did not stem
from an intentional refusal to obey the court order or a failure to make a good faith effort to repay.
Barklind, 87 Wash. 2d at 817–18, 557 P.2d at 317–18; see also State v. Blank, 131 Wash. 2d 230,
238, 930 P.2d 1213, 1218 (1997) (“While some courts have reasoned that a recoupment statute itself
must expressly contain those conditions rendering it constitutional . . . we have already acknowledged
that a recoupment order may be entered in the absence of a statute expressly containing all the
necessary procedural safeguards, provided that constitutionally necessary features of a recoupment
structure are in place.”). Thus, even though mandatory LFOs imposed on defendants who are indigent
or disabled may ignore the spirit of Barklind, they do not technically violate the letters of
the constitution.
94. See, e.g., State v. Seward, 196 Wash. App. 579, 384 P.3d 620 (2017) (imposing mandatory
LFOs on indigent defendants permissible when premised on assumption that defendants will gain
ability to pay in future). Previous cases on the subject indicated that courts could impose mandatory
LFOs on indigent defendants as long as those defendants retained the ability to modify the debt via a
demonstration that they were “ultimately unable to pay.” Curry, 118 Wash. 2d at 916, 829 P.2d at
168; see also Fuller, 417 U.S. at 47 (noting that defendants can argue at any time that payment would
impose “manifest hardship”); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 667–68 (1983) (“[I]f the State
determines a fine or restitution to be the appropriate and adequate penalty for the crime, it may not
thereafter imprison a person solely because he lacked the resources to pay it.”).
95. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 667–68 (“The rule of Williams and Tate, then, is that the State cannot
‘impos[e] a fine as a sentence and then automatically conver[t] it into a jail term solely because the
defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.’ In other words, if the State determines
a fine or restitution to be the appropriate and adequate penalty for the crime, it may not thereafter
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provide the best argument for judicial or legislative relief.
With no remission mechanism currently in place for mandatory LFOs,
ongoing debt burdens and persistent court jurisdiction impede SSIdependent defendants from acquiring stable housing or financial security.
As a consequence, such defendants struggle to reintegrate into society.
II.

MOTIVATIONS FOR JUSTICE: PUBLIC INTEREST
CONCERNS STEMMING FROM LFOS IN WASHINGTON

Despite the State’s argument that remitting mandatory LFOs would do
little to benefit the public’s interests,96 the current state of LFO law in
Washington hinders defendants who are disabled and indigent from
reintegrating into society.
Washington’s legislature did not intend for LFOs to be universally
equal in application.97 However, LFOs produce significant disparities on
several fronts. For example, “African-Americans in Washington State are
2.3 times more likely than whites to be sentenced to fines and fees, and
carry about three times the debt in unpaid monetary sanctions.”98
Furthermore, a 2008 study examining LFOs in Washington State found
that, due to interest accrual and high rates of non-payment, “the legal debt
of most of those sentenced in 2004 had grown rather than shrunk
by 2007.”99
When calculating benefits, the income that Washington derives from
LFOs is also questionable. Income from LFOs was equivalent to “an
average of 1.3 percent of Washington State county criminal justice
budgets” in 2006, challenging the notion that LFOs are a major source of
funding for courts.100 Illustratively, Washington’s state and county
governments collected $21.6 million in LFOs in 2003–2004.101 However,
the state and counties spent $16 million on collection efforts for LFOs in

imprison a person solely because he lacked the resources to pay it.” (alterations in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971))).
96. Answer to Petition for Review at 20, State v. Conway, 194 Wash. 2d 1010, 452 P.3d 1240
(2019) (No. 97374-1-II) [hereinafter Answer to Petition for Review] (“Conway’s case is not
representative of all indigent defendants and is not a case in which the public would have a substantial
interest.”).
97. See State v. Blazina, 182 Wash. 2d 827, 834, 344 P.3d 680, 683 (2015).
98. Eckart, supra note 10.
99. BECKETT ET AL., supra note 38, at 2.
100. Id. at 73.
101. Beckett & Harris, supra note 55, at 528 (citing WASH. STATE ASS’N OF CNTY. OFFS., 2009
REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE ON THE FISCAL IMPACT OF ESSB 5990 (2009)).
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that time period.102 And the State’s direct collection costs for LFOs, such
as mailing monthly statements and employing additional clerks to work
on LFO collection, “include[d] $3 million in state funds” in addition to
other indirect costs.103 Accordingly, the net profit from LFOs for the year
was less than $6 million.104
Statistics such as these prompted the Washington legislature to pass
Washington House Bill (HB) 1783 to end interest on non-restitution LFOs
and limit their impacts on defendants who are indigent.105
A.

Constraints on Resources for SSI Recipients

Washington’s high housing prices and the statutory limits on SSI
recipients’ ability to procure additional income contribute to
Washington’s disproportionately large number of individuals who are
both homeless and have disabilities.
To receive SSI, an individual must be unable “to engage in any
substantial gainful activity” due to blindness or a physical or mental
impairment that is either terminal or has lasted or can be expected to last
for at least a year.106 The amount of benefits provided will be reduced if
the recipient acquires additional resources that they can use to meet food

102. Id. at 527–28 (citing WASH. STATE ASS’N OF CNTY. OFFS., 2009 REPORT TO THE
WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE ON THE FISCAL IMPACT OF ESSB 5990 (2009)).
103. The study’s authors were unable to determine whether LFO collection actually generated
enough revenue to pay for the collection of the fees due to insufficient data. BECKETT ET AL., supra
note 38, at 71–72.
104. Beckett & Harris, supra note 55, at 527–28 (citing WASH. STATE ASS’N OF CNTY. OFFS., 2009
REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE ON THE FISCAL IMPACT OF ESSB 5990 (2009)).
105. See Public Hearing on H.B. 1501, H.B. 1720, H.B. 1798, H.B. 1822, and H.B. 1783 Before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 2017 Leg., 65th Sess. (Wash. 2017) [hereinafter H. Judiciary Comm.
Hearing], https://www.tvw.org/watch/?clientID=9375922947&eventID=2017021130
&startStreamAt=1230&stopStreamAt=1900&autoStartStream=true [https://perma.cc/E8JQ-A57B]
(statement of Rep. Roger Goodman, Chair, H. Comm. on Pub. Safety).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)–(B); see also id. § 423(d)(5)(A) (“An individual shall not be
considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the
existence thereof as the Commissioner of Social Security may require. An individual’s statement as
to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability as defined in this
section; there must be medical signs and findings, established by medically acceptable clinical or
laboratory diagnostic techniques, which show the existence of a medical impairment that results from
anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which could reasonably be expected to
produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which, when considered with all evidence required
to be furnished under this paragraph (including statements of the individual or his physician as to the
intensity and persistence of such pain or other symptoms which may reasonably be accepted as
consistent with the medical signs and findings), would lead to a conclusion that the individual is under
a disability. Objective medical evidence of pain or other symptoms established by medically
acceptable clinical or laboratory techniques (for example, deteriorating nerve or muscle tissue) must
be considered in reaching a conclusion as to whether the individual is under a disability.”).
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or shelter needs.107 Additionally, an individual’s SSI benefits may be
terminated outright if the recipient accumulates more than $2,000 in
assets; or $3,000 for a couple if both spouses collect SSI.108
In 2020, a single individual earning precisely 125% of the federal
poverty line—the threshold below which a Washington court will not
impose discretionary LFOs109—would have a monthly income of roughly
$1,329.110 A married couple earning $1,796 per month would have the
same financial status, with an added $467 of wiggle room for each
additional family member.111 A couple with both spouses collecting SSI
received only $1,175 per month in 2020, and an individual received only
$783 per month.112
The federal government does not consider local housing markets when
calculating benefits. Washington’s housing recently ranked seventh most
expensive in the nation, with a fair market monthly rent of $1,164 for a
one-bedroom apartment in 2019,113 up from $982 in 2017.114 Again: a
couple with both parties collecting SSI received only $1,175 per month
in 2020.115
Financial hardship also has greater repercussions for individuals with
disabilities when it comes to retaining shelter. In 2010, 36.8% of people
in homeless shelters nationwide reported disabilities, compared to 15.3%
of the overall population.116 On the state level, 5,775 Washington
residents with disabilities experienced homelessness for at least twelve
out of the last thirty-six months in 2018.117 And the number of individuals

107. Countable Income for SSI Program, supra note 75.
108. Spotlight on Resources—2019 Edition, supra note 76.
109. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.101.010(3)(a)–(c) (2020).
110. Federal Poverty Guidelines–2020, MASSLEGAL SERVS. (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.mass
legalservices.org/content/federal-poverty-guidelines-2020 [https://perma.cc/QA28-FHTK].
111. Id.
112. SSI Federal Payment Amounts, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. [hereinafter SSI Federal Payment
Amounts], https://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/SSIamts.html [https://perma.cc/4X5S-M6YA].
113. NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH 2019, at 256 (2019) [hereinafter OUT OF
REACH 2019].
114. NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH 2017: THE HIGH COST OF HOUSING 252
(2017) [hereinafter OUT OF REACH 2017].
115. SSI Federal Payment Amounts, supra note 112.
116. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., THE 2010 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT REPORT TO
CONGRESS 16 (2010). That number is nevertheless a decrease from the worst part of the Great
Recession in 2008, when 43% of people living in homeless shelters reported having a disability.
REBECCA VALLAS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, DISABLED BEHIND BARS: THE MASS INCARCERATION
OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN AMERICA’S JAILS AND PRISONS 14 (2016) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF
HOUS. & URB. DEV., THE 2008 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT REPORT TO CONGRESS (2009)).
117. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., THE 2018 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT REPORT TO
CONGRESS 95 (2018).
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with disabilities who are on the brink of homelessness is staggering. The
Department of Housing and Urban Development found that 40% of
households that met the Department’s standard for “worst-case housing
needs”118 in 2008 were headed by someone between eighteen and sixtyone years of age, and had at least one household member with a
disability.119 If housing prices continue to rise at the same rates that they
have recently—an 18.53% jump in just two years—Washington’s
homeless population is sure to continue rising with it.120 The COVID-19
pandemic will likely exacerbate the crisis.
B.

Criminal Justice Interactions for Disabled Individuals

Interactions with the criminal justice system compound the inherent
struggles that SSI recipients already face. From the outset, individuals
with disabilities are disproportionately likely to interact with the criminal
justice system. Jails and prisons in 2016 contained three times as many
people with mental health conditions as state mental hospitals.121 Further,
incarcerated individuals report disabilities at almost three times the rate of
nonincarcerated individuals.122
In addition to the everyday challenges of existing with a disability,
reentry programs for the formerly incarcerated “often lack necessary
accommodations and connections to community services” that would
enable them to meet the needs of individuals with disabilities.123 Only
19.1% of the population with a disability was employed in 2018,
compared to 65.9% of the population without a disability.124 The
unemployment rate—measuring individuals actively searching for
work—for disabled individuals was more than double the rate for

118. KATHRYN P. NELSON, TECH. ASSISTANCE COLLABORATIVE, THE HIDDEN HOUSING CRISIS:
WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS AMONG ADULTS WITH DISABILITIES 1–2 (2008),
http://www.tacinc.org/media/13262/Hidden%20Housing%20Crisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/FCR9BPMH] (defining “worst-case housing needs” as “unassisted renters with income below half of their
area’s median income (‘very-low-income’ renters) who pay more than half of their income for
housing or live in severely substandard housing”).
119. VALLAS, supra note 116, at 14 (citing NELSON, supra note 118).
120. Compare OUT OF REACH 2019, supra note 113, at 256, with OUT OF REACH 2017, supra
note 114, at 252.
121. VALLAS, supra note 116, at 1–2 (citing JENNIFER BRONSON, LAURA M. MARUSCHAK &
MARCUS BERZOFSKY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., DISABILITIES AMONG PRISON
AND JAIL INMATES, 2011–12 (2015)).
122. Id. (citing BRONSON ET AL., supra note 121).
123. Id. at 3.
124. Persons with a Disability: Labor Force Characteristics Summary, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB.
STATS.: ECON. NEWS RELEASE (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/disabl.nr0.htm
[https://perma.cc/UVK2-96PV].
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individuals without a disability in 2018, at 8.0% versus 3.7%.125
Former defendants cannot vacate their convictions without discharging
their LFO debt—even if their only income is SSI.126 A defendant must pay
off all their LFO debt to obtain a certificate of discharge, which
Washington requires to vacate a conviction from their criminal record.127
Convictions that a person cannot vacate sprout collateral consequences,
appearing on background checks that are crucial to “stable employment,
housing, financial status, and family relations that enable
successful reintegration.”128
Despite the State’s arguments that mandatory LFOs do not present a
significant public interest concern,129 a storm brews on the horizon as
Washington’s homeless population has continued to rise in recent
years.130 Experiencing homelessness correlates to higher levels of
psychiatric distress, which can exacerbate existing mental illnesses.131
This triggers a spiral: someone who is disabled by mental illness is likely

125. Id.
126. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.637(1)(a) (2020); see State v. Catling, 193 Wash. 2d 252, 268,
438 P.3d 1174, 1182 (2019) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
127. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.640 (“Every offender who has been discharged under
RCW 9.94A.637 may apply to the sentencing court for a vacation of the offender’s record of
conviction.”); id. § 9.94A.637(1) (“When an offender has completed all requirements of the sentence,
including any and all legal financial obligations . . . the secretary or the secretary’s designee shall
notify the sentencing court, which shall discharge the offender and provide the offender with a
certificate of discharge . . . .”); id. § 9.94A.637(2)(a) (“When an offender has reached the end of his
or her supervision with the department and has completed all the requirements of the sentence except
his or her legal financial obligations, the secretary’s designee shall provide the county clerk with a
notice that the offender has completed all nonfinancial requirements of the sentence. The notice must
list the specific sentence requirements that have been completed, so that it is clear to the sentencing
court that the offender is entitled to discharge upon completion of the legal financial obligations of
the sentence.” (emphasis added)).
128. Adams et al., supra note 13, at 4.
129. Answer to Petition for Review, supra note 96, at 20 (“Conway’s case is not representative of
all indigent defendants and is not a case in which the public would have a substantial interest.”).
130. See, e.g., Kate Walters, Seattle Homeless Population Is Third Largest in U.S., After LA and
NYC, KUOW (Dec. 18, 2018, 7:19 PM), https://www.kuow.org/stories/here-s-how-seattle-andwashington-compare-to-national-homeless-trends [https://perma.cc/8VAA-4YFY] (“Washington
state’s homeless population saw one of the biggest increases in the country this year, up by more than
1,000 people over last year. More than 22,000 people were counted in shelters and on the streets in
Washington on a single night in 2018. The state also had one of the highest rates of people living
outside.”); Vernal Coleman, Washington State Homeless Numbers Grew Last Year, SEATTLE TIMES
(Oct. 12, 2017, 3:06 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/washington-state-homelessnumbers-grew-last-year/ [https://perma.cc/N8ZT-HSB8] (“Washington’s homeless population rose
by 3.5 percent over last year despite increasing efforts to place more people living without shelter into
permanent housing.”).
131. Peter Tarr, Homelessness and Mental Illness: A Challenge to Our Society, BRAIN & BEHAV.
RSCH. FOUND. (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.bbrfoundation.org/blog/homelessness-and-mentalillness-challenge-our-society [https://perma.cc/2DRG-KJBH].

Brinkmann (Do Not Delete)

1972

12/14/2020 9:13 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1953

eligible for SSI, but the program’s limits on recipients’ asset acquisition
hampers their ability to retain a personal safety net.132 Because of SSI
asset limits, even a $250 VPA for a misdemeanor will consume a
significant portion of the recipient’s savings—if they have any at all—
potentially eviscerating their ability to eat or pay rent.133 Even if a
recipient has only mandatory LFOs that are immediately suspended
because of their SSI status, that person must still, at the very least, acquire
transportation to court to demonstrate proof of their ongoing SSI status.
And if their ability to pay rent is sufficiently crippled, an eviction will
follow, kicking the recipient onto the street with an ongoing LFO debt
burden and permanent conviction record.
The spiral will not end once the former defendant lands on the street.
Homeless individuals with severe mental illness have some of the highest
rates of interaction with the criminal justice system, and each new
conviction triggers additional mandatory LFOs.134 With approximately
80% of private landlords using backgrounds checks, former defendants
who are disabled and cannot retire their LFOs to clear their records are
even more likely to fail a background check.135 Moreover, remitting even
discretionary LFOs requires a court appearance, which presents an
additional complication for those who have no address at which they can
receive summons to court.136 Programs that provide stable housing for
time periods over one year can help improve mental health,137 but such
initiatives amount to a band-aid remedy for the symptoms of the
underlying problem.138
Collateral consequences of convictions abound even for able-bodied
individuals with LFOs. By itself, outstanding LFO debt creates
“incentives to avoid work, to return to crime, and/or to hide from the

132. Spotlight on Resources—2019 Edition, supra note 76.
133. See supra section II.A.
134. Tarr, supra note 131.
135. See VALLAS, supra note 116, at 15.
136. Erasmus Baxter, Despite Reform Attempts, Court-Imposed Costs Burden Low-Income
Defendants, SEATTLE TIMES (July 14, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/homeless/despite-reform-attempts-court-imposed-costs-burden-low-income-defendants/
[https://perma.cc/U6UA-ED5K].
137. Tarr, supra note 131.
138. For example, Ms. Conway has worked with a housing support organization, Share
A.S.P.I.R.E., for several years, but was still struggling to find stable housing throughout her appeal.
Brief for ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, State v. Conway, 194 Wash. 2d
1010, 452 P.3d 1240 (2019) (No. 50032-9-II); see Jessica Lightheart, Share Housing Programs,
SHARE (Oct. 21, 2013), https://www.sharevancouver.org/2013/10/21/share-housing-programs/
[https://perma.cc/J4CY-NCKX] (explaining that Share A.S.P.I.R.E. provides housing support for
families, veterans, and people with disabilities).
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authorities.”139 In conjunction with unshakeable debt, a permanent
conviction history impedes defendants’ ability to reintegrate into society.
Thus, LFOs trap defendants who are indigent and disabled under evergrowing collateral consequences, with no end in sight.
III. JUSTICE ON THE HORIZON: CHANGING TIDES IN THE
COURTS AND LEGISLATURE
Washington courts have recently begun to push back against partially
funding the criminal justice system out of the pockets of defendants who
are indigent. The legislature responded in kind, and the two branches have
spent the last few years incrementally limiting the situations in which
courts must impose certain LFOs.
A.

State v. Blazina Starts to Shift the Balance

For almost a decade, RCW 10.01.160, one of the major statutes
governing discretionary LFOs in Washington, required courts to consider
defendants’ financial status before imposing discretionary LFOs.
However, the statute provided an extremely vague standard for courts to
measure defendants’ financial standing:
The court shall not order a defendant to pay costs unless the
defendant is or will be able to pay them. In determining the
amount and method of payment of costs, the court shall take
account of the financial resources of the defendant and the nature
of the burden that payment of costs will impose.140
For many years, courts fulfilled their obligation to consider defendants’
resources and the prospective burden of LFOs by signing pre-printed
judgment and sentences with boilerplate language declaring that the court
had performed the requisite inquiry.141 The courts rarely, if ever, solicited
information about defendants’ incomes or assets.142
In State v. Blazina,143 a sentencing court used a boilerplate judgment
and sentence to order two defendants to pay discretionary LFOs without
making any on-the-record assessment of their ability to pay.144 On appeal,
the defendants “argued that a trial judge must make an individualized
139. BECKETT ET AL., supra note 38, at 68.
140. 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws 1656.
141. State v. Blazina, 182 Wash. 2d 827, 831, 344 P.3d 680, 681 (2015); see also State v. Ramirez,
191 Wash. 2d 732, 739, 426 P.3d 714, 718 (2018) (“[LFOs] are often imposed with very
little discussion.”).
142. See Blazina, 182 Wash. 2d at 837–38, 344 P.3d at 685.
143. 182 Wash. 2d 827, 344 P.3d 680 (2015).
144. Id. at 830, 344 P.3d at 681.
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inquiry into a defendant’s ability to pay” on the record before imposing
discretionary LFOs, and that the failure to make such an inquiry mandated
resentencing.145 The Supreme Court of Washington agreed with the
defendants, remanded for new sentencing hearings, and held that a trial
court “must consider the defendant’s current or future ability to pay
[discretionary] LFOs based on the particular facts of the defendant’s
case.”146 Further, trial courts must consider factors such as the defendant’s
incarceration and other debts when weighing an individual’s ability
to pay.147
In its reasoning, the Blazina decision listed several nationwide issues
that stem from courts imposing LFOs on defendants who are indigent,
including such defendants’ “increased difficulty in reentering society, the
doubtful recoupment of money by the government, and inequities in
administration” of those LFOs.148 In particular, the Court noted that those
inequities result in scenarios where collection fees and interest drown
indigent defendants in debt that individuals with thicker wallets
easily avoid:
Consequently, indigent offenders owe higher LFO sums than
their wealthier counterparts because they cannot afford to
pay. . . . The inability to pay off the LFOs means that courts retain
jurisdiction over impoverished offenders long after they are
released from prison . . . . This active record can have serious
negative consequences on employment, on housing, and
on finances.149
The Blazina Court determined that the “legislature did not intend LFO
orders to be uniform among cases of similar crimes. Rather, it intended
each judge to conduct a case-by-case analysis and arrive at an LFO order
appropriate to the individual defendant’s circumstances.”150 Now, a
sentencing court “must do more than sign a boilerplate judgment and
sentence stating that it engaged in the required inquiry”; the judge must
consider factors “such as incarceration and a defendant’s other debts,
including restitution, when determining a defendant’s ability to pay”
discretionary LFOs.151
145. Id.
146. Id. at 834, 344 P.3d at 683 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.160(3) (2015)).
147. Id. at 838, 344 P.3d at 685.
148. Id. at 835, 344 P.3d at 683.
149. Id. at 836–37, 344 P.3d at 684 (first citing BECKETT ET AL., supra note 38, at 9–11, 21–22;
and then citing ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS 68–69
(2010), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/ InForAPenny_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5NE-DPRE]).
150. Blazina, 182 Wash. 2d at 834, 344 P.3d at 683.
151. Id. at 838, 344 P.3d at 685.
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The Blazina Court specifically referred judges to Washington State
Courts General Rule 34,152 which allows individuals to obtain waivers of
filing fees and surcharges due to indigency.153 The GR 34 standard is
analogous to the current standard for indigence found in RCW 10.101.010
and discussed above.154 The Blazina Court summarized the weight of the
indigency standard: “if someone does meet the GR 34 standard for
indigency, courts should seriously question that person’s ability to pay
LFOs.”155 Several years later, the legislature agreed and HB 1783
was born.
B.

A Bill Concerning Legal Financial Obligations: HB 1783

Washington’s legislature followed the Blazina Court’s lead on LFOs in
2018. HB 1783 amended a slew of statutes governing LFOs, almost
universally to the benefit of indigent and near-indigent defendants.156
HB 1783’s sponsors expressed extreme concern about how the bill
would affect both defendants and victims. During one hearing, primary
sponsor Representative Roger Goodman emphasized the 23.8% rate of
return on LFOs.157 He argued that this low return rate interfered with the
primary goals of imposing LFOs: aiding victims through restitution
payments, prompting defendants to meet their obligations, and helping to
fund the criminal justice system.158 Goodman also noted that interest
impedes many defendants from paying their LFOs because the 12%
interest rate escalates the total cost far beyond the defendant’s ability to
pay.159 The other primary sponsor, police-officer-turned-Representative
Jeff Holy, raised concerns about ongoing debt burdens suppressing
defendants’ ability to “come back to the right side” of the law, thus
inadvertently forcing them into recidivism.160
One of the major components of HB 1783 is that “penalties, fines, bail

152. WASH. CT. GEN. R. 34.
153. Id.
154. Compare WASH. CT. GEN. R. 34, with WASH. REV. CODE § 10.101.010(3)(a)–(c) (2020). See
also supra section I.B.
155. Blazina, 182 Wash. 2d at 839, 344 P.3d at 685.
156. Legal Financial Obligations, H.B. 1783, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018).
157. H. Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 105, at 26:40; see Legislature Passes Bill, supra
note 49.
158. H. Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 105, at 26:30; see also BECKETT ET AL., supra
note 38, at 74 (explaining that Washington imposes LFOs to hold defendants accountable for
misbehavior).
159. H. Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 105, at 26:30 (statement of Rep. Roger Goodman,
Chair, H. Comm. on Pub. Safety).
160. Id. at 26:11 (statement of Rep. Jeff Holy, Sen. L. & Just. Comm.).
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forfeitures, fees, . . . costs imposed against a defendant in a criminal
proceeding,” and other “non-restitution legal financial obligations” no
longer accrue interest.161 This marked the end of the 12% interest rate that
previously crippled many defendants’ ability to pay.162
HB 1783 amended many RCWs to shorten the length of interactions
with the criminal justice system for defendants who a court has found
indigent.163 For example, a defendant who is indigent may now pay all of
their discretionary LFOs in installments.164
Once a court finds a defendant indigent, HB 1783 sets in place several
additional protections. Courts can no longer order defendants who a court
has found indigent to pay RCW 10.01.160 costs: “expenses specially
incurred by the state in prosecuting the defendant,” administering a
deferred prosecution, or pretrial supervision.165 HB 1783 added language
to several statutes to require a hearing to find a defendant’s failure to pay
LFOs willful before the defendant may be sanctioned for contempt; these
statutes also acquired provisions indicating that defendants who are
indigent are “presumed to lack the current ability to pay” those LFOs.166
A court that finds a defendant to be homeless or have mental illness now
cannot consider that defendant’s failure to pay LFOs as willful contempt;
therefore, such defendants may not be subjected to penalties for failure to
pay.167 And most importantly, HB 1783 removed section 10.01.160 of the
Revised Code of Washington’s language, “[t]he court shall not order a
defendant to pay costs unless the defendant is or will be able to pay them,”
and replaced it with, “[t]he court shall not order a defendant to pay costs
if the defendant at the time of sentencing is indigent as defined in
RCW 10.101.010(3)(a) through (c).”168
Finally, HB 1783 spared indigent defendants from another mandatory
LFO: the bill confined the DNA collection fee to a single instance, instead
of requiring additional collections for each new felony conviction.169
However, HB 1783 left the VPA functionally untouched.170
161. Wash. H.B. 1783, §§ 1–5.
162. Questions and Answers, supra note 50.
163. See Wash. H.B. 1783 (“[A]mending RCW 110.82.090, 3.50.100, 3.62.040, 35.20.220,
10.01.160, 10.01.170, 210.01.180, 10.46.190, 10.64.015, 9.92.070, 10.73.160, 9.94A.6333,
39.94A.760, 9.94B.040, 3.62.085, 36.18.020, 43.43.7541, and 7.68.035; reenacting and amending
RCW 3.62.020; and creating new sections.”).
164. Id. § 11.
165. Id. §§ 6, 14.
166. Id. §§ 8, 13, 15.
167. Id. §§ 8, 13–15.
168. Id. § 6 (emphasis added).
169. Id. §§ 16–18.
170. Id. § 19(4).
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RCW 7.68.035 codifies the VPA—Washington’s only remaining
universally mandatory LFO for criminal defendants—as “[w]hen any
person is found guilty in any superior court of having committed a
crime . . . there shall be imposed by the court upon such convicted person
a penalty assessment” of $500 for any case including a felony or gross
misdemeanor and $250 for any case including only misdemeanors.171
Nevertheless, HB 1783 demonstrated the Washington legislature’s
interest in speeding defendants’ reintegration. The back-and-forth
progress between the courts and legislature continued immediately after
the passage of HB 1783 when State v. Ramirez172 arrived in the Supreme
Court of Washington.
C.

State v. Ramirez Requires Judicial Consideration of Defendant
Finances

Blazina barred courts from using boilerplate language to claim that they
had performed an individualized inquiry into defendants’ finances.
However, the exact applicable standard eluded courts for several more
years, and judges often continued to impose discretionary LFOs with little
or no discussion.173 State v. Ramirez brought the issue to the forefront
when David Ramirez appealed the imposition of $2,900 in LFOs—
including $2,100 in discretionary LFOs.174 Mr. Ramirez argued that the
court failed to adequately inquire into his ability to pay before imposing
the LFOs, because the judge’s inquiry consisted of asking the prosecutor,
“[a]nd when he is not in jail, he has the ability to make money to make
periodic payments on his LFOs, right?”175
The Supreme Court of Washington granted review to address only the
imposition of Mr. Ramirez’s discretionary LFOs.176 Part of the Court’s
rationale for granting review was the recent passage of HB 1783, which
the Court described as “addressing some of the worst facets of the system
that prevent offenders from rebuilding their lives after conviction.”177 The
Court also referred back to language from Blazina and Wakefield to
highlight the importance of the individualized inquiry into a defendant’s

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

WASH. REV. CODE § 7.68.035(1)(a) (2020).
191 Wash. 2d 732, 426 P.3d 714 (2018).
Id. at 739, 426 P.3d at 718.
Id. at 736, 426 P.3d at 716.
Id. at 737, 426 P.3d at 717.
Id. at 738, 426 P.3d at 717.
Id. at 747, 426 P.3d at 721.
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ability to pay.178
The Court identified the financial statement section of a motion for
indigency as providing “a reliable framework for the individualized
inquiry that Blazina and RCW 10.01.160(3) require.”179 The financial
statement asks for information regarding a defendant’s income,
employment history, “assets and other financial resources,” living
expenses, and “other debts.”180 The Court described each of those
categories as “equally relevant to determining a defendant’s ability to pay
discretionary LFOs.”181 As a result, the financial statement serves as the
perfect vehicle for a sentencing court’s analysis of a defendant’s ability
to pay.
Ramirez ultimately held that a trial court must make an on-the-record
inquiry into a defendant’s present and future ability to pay LFOs.182 Courts
can no longer merely draw from statements made at trial when the
defendant is attempting to appear in the best light possible to a jury for the
purposes of proving their innocence.183
D.

State v. Conway: Justice, Attempted

Although courts weighing whether to impose discretionary LFOs must
now explicitly consider a defendant’s financial status, mandatory LFOs
have no such gatekeeping test. Karen Conway’s case exemplifies the
problems that arise from protecting defendants who are indigent from only
some LFOs.
When Ms. Conway pleaded guilty to one count of maintaining a
dwelling for controlled substances in 2007, the Clark County Superior
Court assessed her a $500 VPA, a $200 filing fee, a $700 fee for a courtappointed attorney, a $1,000 “Drug Fund fee,” a $100 “Crime Lab fee,” a
$100 DNA sample collection fee, and an unlabeled $500 fine for a total
bill of $3,100.184 Despite her only source of income being SSI, Ms.
Conway made monthly payments of between $5 and $25 to Clark County
starting in 2007.185 Ms. Conway had paid $1,105 towards her legal debt
by 2019, but interest rates and collection agency fees ate up the bulk of
178. Id. at 743, 426 P.3d at 720 (first citing City of Richland v. Wakefield, 186 Wash. 2d 596, 606,
380 P.3d 459, 465 (2016); and then citing State v. Blazina, 182 Wash. 2d 827, 838–39, 344 P.3d 680,
685 (2015)).
179. Id. at 744, 426 P.3d at 720.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 745–46, 426 P.3d at 721.
183. Id.
184. Petition for Review, supra note 2, at 2 n.1.
185. Id. at 3.
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her payments instead of reducing the principal debt.186
Ms. Conway filed a motion to remit the remaining balance of her LFOs
except for the VPA and the filing fee in 2016.187 She also sought a
certificate of discharge to vacate her conviction under RCW 9.94A.637.188
Ms. Conway pointed out that she had completed all of her non-LFO
sentencing conditions and that the Department of Corrections had ended
supervision of her case in October of 2008, leaving her LFOs as the only
barrier to clearing her conviction record.189
The Superior Court found that Ms. Conway was indigent and had
received SSI for twenty-seven years.190 The court issued an order
remitting all of the requested LFOs and the balance of interest owed,
leaving Ms. Conway with a balance of $493.55 on the VPA and $197.41
on the criminal filing fee, nine years after she had begun paying down
the debt.191
On her direct appeal, Ms. Conway also challenged the VPA and filing
fee on equal protection and substantive due process grounds, which the
court rejected.192 The Court of Appeals highlighted that the legislature
could correct judicial interpretation of statutes but had not done so with
regard to mandatory LFOs.193
When Ms. Conway appealed again, seeking review from the Supreme
Court of Washington, the State relied heavily on the trial judge’s
statement that they “could conceive of circumstances where Conway may
be able to pay the fines in the future.”194 The State also argued that
assessing the VPA against all criminal defendants “is a rational means of
186. Id.
187. State v. Conway, 8 Wash. App. 2d 538, 542, 438 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2019).
188. Petition for Review, supra note 2, at 3–4.
189. Id.
190. Conway, 8 Wash. App. 2d at 542, 438 P.3d at 1238.
191. Id. at 542–43, 438 P.3d at 1238–39.
192. Id. at 543, 438 P.3d at 1238–39. The parties agreed that the HB 1783 legislative changes did
not apply to Ms. Conway’s case, so Division II of the Court of Appeals avoided discussing the
amendments when it affirmed the superior court’s refusal to remit Ms. Conway’s remaining LFOs.
Id. at 541 n.2, 438 P.3d at 1238. Additionally, the court rejected Ms. Conway’s request to extend
Fuller v. Oregon to prevent courts from imposing mandatory LFOs on indigent defendants. Id. at 549,
438 P.3d at 1241 (citing State v. Mathers, 193 Wash. App. 913, 926, 376 P.3d 1163, 1170 (2016)). In
doing so, the court pointed to a previous case where the same division had recognized that for “an
indigent defendant saddled with [LFOs], it does not matter if the LFOs are labeled mandatory or
discretionary. . . . However, until there are legislative amendments or Supreme Court changes in
precedent, [courts] must recognize these distinctions and adhere to the principles of stare decisis.”
Mathers, 193 Wash. App. at 916, 376 P.3d at 1165.
193. Conway, 8 Wash. App. 2d at 544–48, 438 P.3d at 1239–41 (“Where the legislature has had
time to correct a court’s interpretation of a statute and has not done so, we presume the legislature
approves of our interpretation.” (citing Mathers, 193 Wash. App. at 918, 376 P.3d at 1166)).
194. Answer to Petition for Review, supra note 96, at 2.
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achieving the governmental objectives” of funding programs for victims
and compensating court clerks.195 Because some defendants will be able
to pay right away, or will eventually acquire gainful employment, the
State argued that “the imposition of these fees on all offenders serves to
create funding for these purposes.”196 The State also argued that “[i]t is
easy to conceive of situations in which an offender who is indigent at the
time of sentencing and even after sentencing will be able to pay the fees
and assessments in the future.”197 The State further argued that “Conway’s
case is not representative of all indigent defendants and is not a case in
which the public would have a substantial interest.”198
The Supreme Court of Washington denied Ms. Conway’s Petition for
Review on December 3, 2019, confining her to a purgatory of debt, ruined
credit, and an unstable housing situation for the foreseeable future.199
Justice, it seems, was in short supply.
Karen Conway is not the only disabled defendant to struggle with
mandatory LFOs. Several cases posing near-identical questions reached
the Courts of Appeals in 2019. All met the same fate as Conway because
Washington’s Courts of Appeals lack the authority to make any
substantive alterations to the controlling statutes.200 Until another
analogous case makes its way up to the Washington Supreme Court, the
legislature is the only institution with the ability to liberate Ms. Conway
and her fellows from purgatory.

195. Id. at 7–8 (first citing WASH. REV. CODE § 7.68.035 (2018); then citing State v. Brewster, 152
Wash. App. 856, 860, 218 P.3d 249 (2009); and then citing State v. Seward, 196 Wash. App. 579,
584–85, 384 P.3d 620, 623 (2016)).
196. Id.
197. Id. (first citing WASH. REV. CODE § 7.68.035; then citing Brewster, 152 Wash. App. at 860,
218 P.3d at 251; and then citing Seward, 196 Wash. App. at 584–85, 384 P.3d at 623). The
government referred to Seward, which produced arguments in favor of imposing mandatory LFOs on
indigent defendants under the theory that some will eventually acquire the ability to pay, and sought
to apply the same logic to barring remission:
[t]he reasoning in Seward is applicable to this case, because preventing remission of mandatory
LFOs serves the same legitimate state interests as requiring their imposition. Preventing
remission of mandatory LFOs for all offenders creates funding for the purposes behind the fees
and assessments because the offenders may be able to pay in the future. When an offender files
a motion to remit their mandatory LFOs while they are currently indigent, and if there are
conceivable situations where they could pay in the future, then they are in the same situation as
when the mandatory LFOs were imposed.
Id. at 12 (citing Seward, 196 Wash. App. at 585, 384 P.3d at 620).
198. Id. at 20.
199. State v. Conway, 194 Wash. 2d 1010, 452 P.3d 1240 (2019) (denying review).
200. See, e.g., State v. Bush-Ford, No. 50731-5-II, 2019 Wash. App. LEXIS 1544 (June 18, 2019)
(upholding imposition of VPA on disabled defendant reliant on SSI); State v. Lacy, No. 50738-2-II,
2019 Wash. App. LEXIS 1342 (May 29, 2019) (holding that the trial court did not have the authority
to revoke VPA imposed on an indigent defendant).
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IV. A PLEA FOR JUSTICE: RECOMMENDATIONS TO STEM
THE TIDE
Ms. Conway’s case—that of a disabled elderly citizen pushed into
homelessness as a result of her conviction—demonstrates the dire
consequences of Washington’s incomplete LFO framework. Although the
Supreme Court of Washington did not review Conway, it remains one of
only two institutions capable of altering the LFO laws and resolving her
predicament. The legislature is the only other entity that can adjust
Washington’s laws to protect defendants who are indigent and disabled
from mandatory LFOs.
Eternally suspended LFO debt prevents chronically disabled
defendants whose only source of income is Social Security benefits from
vacating their convictions.201 The combination of debt and a permanent
conviction record affects credit scores and background checks.202 Stable
housing opportunities dwindle, and employment opportunities evaporate.
The ripple effects escalate, and still the debt lingers.
LFOs may serve a public interest by partially funding the criminal
justice system, but they can only serve that purpose if administered against
individuals who possess the ability to pay them. At least one Washington
court has acknowledged that defendants who are indigent are far more
likely to acquire unexpected medical debt than they are to win the
lottery.203 The Washington legislature has already acknowledged the
inefficacy of stacking fines and fees—especially those which collect
interest—against defendants who are indigent.204 Chronic disabilities
combine with and compound that indigency for many individuals.
The Supreme Court of Washington has not yet patched the hole in the
law that ensnared Ms. Conway. But the justices of the Supreme Court and
the members of the legislature are the only ones with the needle and thread

201. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.637 (2020).
202. See Who Is Allowed to Access Your Equifax® Credit Report?, EQUIFAX,
https://www.equifax.com/personal/education/credit/report/who-is-allowed-to-access-your-creditreport/ [https://perma.cc/5B93-5F6L]; Adams et al., supra note 13, at 26.
203. See State v. Sorrell, 2 Wash. App. 2d 156, 183–84, 408 P.3d 1100, 1114–15 (2018) (“Someone
may worry that Ernest Sorrell might win the lottery tomorrow and that remission of financial
obligations does not recognize this possibility. Nevertheless, the state Supreme Court rejected a
similar argument in State v. Blazina. The State had argued that no one knows what might lie in the
defendant’s future, such that discretionary legal financial obligations should always be imposed. The
law does not commit to speculation. If we wish to speculate, we could also speculate that Ernest
Sorrell will incur substantial medical bills for which he cannot pay. Actually, such a large
unaffordable debt may be more of a probability than speculation.”).
204. See H. Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 105, at 26:30 (statement of Rep. Roger
Goodman, Chair, H. Comm. on Pub. Safety); see also BECKETT ET AL., supra note 38, at 74
(explaining that Washington imposes LFOs to hold defendants accountable for misbehavior).
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capable of mending the law. To better serve the public interest, the Court
and the legislature should use the momentum from HB 1783 to either bar
trial courts from imposing mandatory LFOs on indigent defendants or
allow remission for those who can demonstrate their financial hardship.
A.

Shut the Front Door: Ban Mandatory LFOs for Indigent
Defendants

Trial courts should no longer be able to impose any mandatory LFOs
on defendants who a court finds indigent. Such defendants are already
shielded from discretionary LFOs, thanks to Wakefield and Catling, but
remain exposed to mandatory LFOs. Both the Washington legislature and
Supreme Court of Washington have the power to make that change.
Fortunately, a template already exists in Washington LFO law. The
indigency standard used for discretionary LFOs could be extended to
apply to mandatory LFOs as well. This would ban courts from imposing
all LFOs on people receiving certain means-tested benefits, those
involuntarily committed to public mental health facilities, and those with
a post-tax annual income below 125% of the federal poverty level.205 The
statutory language could mirror that used to bar courts from imposing the
criminal filing fee: “an adult defendant in a criminal case shall be liable
for a fee . . . except this fee shall not be imposed on a defendant who is
indigent as defined in RCW 10.101.010(3)(a) through (c).”206
Under the current law, courts already find many individuals indigent at
sentencing and waive most of their LFOs—despite the theoretical
possibility that those individuals could one day win the lottery and acquire
the ability to pay their LFOs.207 The economic impact of making
mandatory LFOs such as the VPA waivable would be minimal for state
and local governments but life-altering for the individual.208 Barring
courts from imposing any and all LFOs on defendants whose financial
health fails a Ramirez “individualized inquiry” as to their ability to pay
would spare defendants across Washington a great deal of heartache
(and headaches).209
Washington State acknowledges that Ms. Conway is disabled, indigent,
and has received SSI since 1989.210 As an individual with a disability, Ms.

205. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.101.010(3)(a)–(c) (2020).
206. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.18.020(2)(h) (2020).
207. See Sorrell, 2 Wash. App. 2d at 183–84, 408 P.3d at 1115 (“[T]he law does not commit to
speculation.”).
208. See supra section III.B.
209. See supra section III.C.
210. Answer to Petition for Review, supra note 96, at 1.
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Conway suffers disproportionate effects from her ongoing debt burden
and conviction record. Her lead-weighted credit score and permanent
criminal history have undermined her ability to find stable housing—a
necessity so universally acknowledged that, under Washington law, the
status of being homeless automatically exempts a defendant from
contempt of court proceedings for failure to pay LFOs.211
Banning the imposition of mandatory LFOs for indigent defendants
poses a political challenge because Washington overwhelmingly relies on
counties and cities to fund trial courts instead of funding those courts out
of the state budget like New Jersey or Florida.212 Although eliminating
mandatory LFOs for indigent defendants may impact the state’s budget,213
the practical effect of eliminating these LFOs for indigent defendants
would be significantly less than it may first appear. Washington courts
only received a net profit of $6 million from LFOs in 2009, despite
technically collecting $21.6 million in obligations that year.214
The most significant obstacle to passing this kind of legislation would
likely be public perception: the American public has a love-hate
relationship with many of the groups who meet the statutory definition for
indigence. For example, policies that criminalize conduct associated with
homelessness are popular even amongst people who support homeless aid
programs such as subsidized housing.215 Consequently, any such initiative
211. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.180(3)(c) (2020); WASH. REV. CODE. § 9.94A.6333(3)(d)
(2020); id. § 9.94B.040(4)(d) (“If the court determines that the defendant is homeless or a person who
is mentally ill, as defined in RCW 71.24.025, failure to pay a legal financial obligation is not willful
contempt and shall not subject the defendant to penalties.”).
212. CARLSON ET AL., supra note 40, at 1.
213. See id. at 124–28 (“Washington provided a good example of the impacts of primarily local
funding on trial court expenditures and operations. A variety of studies . . . commented about the
inadequacy of trial court funding and the wide variance in available services and programs. Access to
justice varied across the state . . . . While the Washington judiciary was not engaged in a transition to
greater state funding at the time of this study, they were engaged in an equally intense examination
of how their trial courts were funded and what the balance between state and local funding
should be.”).
214. Beckett & Harris, supra note 55, at 527–28 (citing WASH. STATE ASS’N OF CNTY. OFFS., 2009
REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE ON THE FISCAL IMPACT OF ESSB 5990 (2009)).
215. See Scott Clifford & Spencer Piston, Americans Want to Help the Homeless—As Long as They
Don’t Get Too Close. This Explains Why., WASH. POST (July 14, 2017, 4:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/14/americans-want-to-help-thehomeless-as-long-as-theyre-not-around-this-explains-why/ [https://perma.cc/8FFS-DZAS] (“On one
hand, majorities support both aid (60 percent) and subsidized housing (65 percent), with only a small
percentage opposing these policies—by 19 and 17 percent, respectively. On the other, a majority
supports banning panhandling (52 percent) and a plurality supports banning sleeping in public (46
percent)—while only about a quarter of the public opposes these policies, by 23 and 30 percent,
respectively. What’s more, the exclusionary policies are popular even among those who support aid
to homeless people: 47% of those who favor aid to homeless people also support banning
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requires a strong information campaign about the realities of persistent
LFO debt.
Karen Conway unsuccessfully attempted to bring the issue of
mandatory LFOs imposed on disabled defendants in front of the Supreme
Court of Washington. Either the legislature or another defendant must
now take up the issue to demand justice.
B.

Open the Side Window: Allow Remission for Defendants Who
Demonstrate Financial Hardship

No judicial or legislative standard outright endorses trapping
individuals such as Ms. Conway in legal purgatory merely because they
rely on SSI. Yet, any Social Security recipient who interacts with the
criminal justice system and cannot retire their LFO debt faces a permanent
conviction record—with all its collateral consequences—and a lifetime of
hearings about their inability to pay.216 Ideally, Washington courts should
altogether cease imposing LFOs on defendants who are indigent. But if
the courts and legislature are not willing to fully commit to such a plan of
action, they could pursue other, milder alternatives. This Part offers three
different standards for allowing remission of mandatory LFOs after
imposition: permitting remission for either 1) SSI recipients;
2) individuals who receive means-tested benefits; or 3) any defendant
who can demonstrate indigence.
1.

Protecting SSI Recipients Only

As an alternative to barring the imposition of mandatory LFOs on
defendants who are indigent, the courts could adopt one of several
standards for remitting mandatory LFOs. For the first standard, the courts
should allow remission of mandatory LFOs for defendants whose sole
source of income is Social Security disability benefits. This alternative
would tackle the problem faced by Ms. Conway and other SSI recipients
without barring courts from imposing LFOs on all indigent defendants.
This is the most politically feasible option because of its limited scope,
but it would have the least impact in terms of ending cycles of poverty
and incarceration due to the small number of individuals assisted.
Indeed, this approach still falls short on many fronts. SSI recipients
have already been deemed “unemployable”—while technically possible,
the odds of a current or former SSI recipient acquiring even a moderate
panhandling, while 44 percent support a ban on sleeping in public. Only 29 and 36 percent opposed
these policies, while the rest took no position.”).
216. See State v. Catling, 193 Wash. 2d 252, 269, 438 P.3d 1174, 1182 (2019) (Gonzalez,
J., dissenting).
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income are low. Recall that Social Security asset limits mean that SSI
recipients will lose their benefits as soon as they exceed $2,000 in
assets.217 Further, remitting discretionary LFOs requires a court date. If
the same approach is applied to mandatory LFOs, defendants who are
homeless, have mobility issues or lack access to a vehicle will face
additional challenges in terms of both receiving summons and
transporting themselves to court.218 While similar to the first proposed
solution—outright barring courts from imposing mandatory LFOs on
indigent defendants—this option retains a logistical hurdle for defendants,
and will continue to burden the court system with additional hearings as
defendants petition for remission. In contrast, barring the imposition of
mandatory LFOs on defendants who a court finds indigent would clear
space on dockets, as such defendants would have no need for continued
interaction with the court system after their sentencing.
The legislature and Supreme Court of Washington should remember
that this approach will place additional burdens on a class of individuals
that the government has already deemed “unemployable.” This standard
would have the most limited scope and provide the least relief to a
vulnerable population; the standards below provide avenues of relief for
wider classes of defendants.
2.

Protecting Means-Tested Benefits Recipients

As a mid-range solution, the courts could consider petitions for
remission from any defendant who receives means-tested benefits—not
merely SSI recipients.219 Under this approach, a defendant petitioning for
remission of their mandatory LFOs should succeed if they prove that they
receive a means-tested disability benefit and “it appears to the satisfaction
of the court that payment of the amount due will impose manifest hardship
on the defendant or the defendant’s immediate family.”220
217. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)–(B); see also id. § 423(d)(5)(A) (“An individual shall not be
considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the
existence thereof as the Commissioner of Social Security may require.”); WASH. L. HELP, HOW TO
ASK A WASHINGTON STATE COURT TO REDUCE OR WAIVE YOUR LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS
(2019), https://www.washingtonlawhelp.org/files/C9D2EA3F-0350-D9AF-ACAE-BF37E9BC
9FFA/attachments/8627DE75-4487-42B2-9696-7DC430B66616/9913en_motion-to-change-lfo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E2EV-GRCU].
218. Baxter, supra note 136.
219. Means-tested benefits include “[t]emporary assistance for needy families, aged, blind, or
disabled assistance benefits, medical care services under RCW 74.09.035, pregnant women assistance
benefits, poverty-related veterans’ benefits, food stamps or food stamp benefits transferred
electronically, refugee resettlement benefits, medicaid, [and] supplemental security income.” WASH.
REV. CODE § 10.101.010(3)(a) (2020).
220. Id. § 10.01.160(4).
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These defendants will have already gone through a verification process
to demonstrate their financial hardship and could be required to produce
further proof that they have remained in difficult monetary straits since
release. Even this somewhat conservative option would provide relief to
a far larger range of formerly incarcerated individuals than granting
remission to only SSI recipients. At the same time, the impact on state and
local budgets would be negligible because the people benefiting from
remission are highly unlikely to make LFO payments anyway. This
statutory language would be milder than the final remission standard,
which expands the standard for remitting discretionary LFOs to cover
mandatory LFOs as well.221
3.

Protecting Defendants Who Demonstrate Indigence

At the far end of the spectrum, the Washington legislature or Supreme
Court could mandate that trial courts apply the “manifest hardship”
standard used for discretionary LFO remissions and allow remission of
mandatory LFOs for anyone who demonstrates that they meet
RCW 10.101.010(3)’s standard for indigency.222 This definition differs
from the first solution because mandatory LFOs would still be imposed
on all defendants. Defendants would have to proceed through the
additional step of petitioning for forgiveness; but this solution still
ultimately allow many defendants who are found indigent by a court to
discharge their debt burdens.
This option should still soothe those fearing that eliminating LFOs will
reduce the deterrence of the criminal justice system. The people who are
most likely to pay LFOs are the ones who will suffer the least impact from
them; removing $500 from a bank account is a negligible punishment for
a well-to-do individual. In contrast, for an individual near, at, or below the
poverty line, the extreme difficulty of paying the fines and fees associated
with the criminal justice system may be far more worrisome than even the
threat of incarceration. Widespread inability to pay directly contributes to
the 23.8% return rate on LFOs.223 By allowing an escape route for
defendants who truly need relief, courts may reduce some of their
administrative costs as they no longer have to hound defendants who
simply do not have the resources to pay.
While these solutions are all acceptable, the recommendations from
this section are probably far more politically feasible, given public
perceptions about people who meet the statutory definition
221. City of Richland v. Wakefield, 186 Wash. 2d 596, 605–06, 380 P.3d 459, 464 (2016).
222. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.160(4).
223. Legislature Passes Bill, supra note 49.
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for indigence.224
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to perceive the benefits of condemning thousands of
people to society’s fringes for minor criminal infractions. Yet such are the
consequences of the current LFO system in Washington. Mandatory
LFOs, imposed in almost every criminal case in the state, cannot currently
be waived or remitted through a showing of a defendant’s inability to pay
the fines. But until the fines get paid, the former defendant has an open
debt account to the state and cannot vacate their criminal record.
Collateral consequences that hamper stable employment and housing are
almost inevitable followers, frequently locking former defendants into a
cycle of poverty. Washington’s Supreme Court and legislature are the
only institutions that can end the legal purgatory facing Ms. Conway and
other indigent defendants throughout the state—especially SSI recipients.
Washington’s legislature and Supreme Court should continue the work
that they have already started to improve Washington’s LFO system. Bills
such as HB 1783 and cases such as Blazina, Wakefield, and Catling were
a start. But they have more work to do. The optimal solution would bar
trial courts from imposing any and all LFOs on indigent defendants. In
the alternative, after a trial court imposes the mandatory LFOs, defendants
should have the opportunity to petition for remission. Possible classes of
defendants to grant remission to include only SSI recipients; any
defendant receiving means-tested benefits; or any defendant who
demonstrates indigence. Any of those options would provide some
measure of relief, advancing public policy to protect those who are
indigent, disabled, or both.
In the end, all that is left is to ask those with the power to make change,
to weigh the options and rule in favor of justice.

224. See Clifford & Piston, supra note 215.
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